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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-05T07:17:36.215273+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99249</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-99249</title>
    <updated>2026-11-05T07:17:36.223259+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable</p>
<p>When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:</p>
<p>Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):</p>
<p>Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer's fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.</p>
<p>Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.</p>
<p>This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99249"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mgg4-g6ph-qf96</id>
    <title>GHSA-mgg4-g6ph-qf96</title>
    <updated>2026-11-05T07:17:36.223360+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p>
<p>pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable</p>
<p>When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits
until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the
namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids
allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every
suspend attempt fails:</p>
<p>Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):</p>
<p>Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which
returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer's fake signal; the loop then clears
TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop
sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING
there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt
and the task spins until the wait ends.</p>
<p>Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the
freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE |
TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does.</p>
<p>This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the
threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does
not reap those killed during the dump.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-mgg4-g6ph-qf96"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99249</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99249</title>
    <updated>2026-11-05T07:17:36.223403+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 257 more</p>
<p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pid_namespace: make zap_pid_ns_processes() freezable When the init of a pid namespace exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() waits until all other pids in the namespace are freed. A tracer outside the namespace that does not reap its traced zombies keeps those pids allocated, so this wait has no upper bound, and while it lasts every suspend attempt fails:   Freezing user space processes failed after 20.006 seconds (2 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0): Neither wait is freezable. The first loop sleeps in do_wait(), which returns -ERESTARTSYS on the freezer's fake signal; the loop then clears TIF_SIGPENDING and waits again without ever freezing. The final loop sleeps in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, and since nothing clears TIF_SIGPENDING there, schedule() returns immediately after the first freeze attempt and the task spins until the wait ends. Sleep in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in do_wait(), so that the freezer can freeze tasks waiting there directly, and in TASK_IDLE | TASK_FREEZABLE in the final loop, like coredump_task_exit() does. This was hit with Chromium-based browsers: crashpad ptrace-attaches the threads of a crashed renderer, which is a pid namespace init, and does not reap those killed during the dump.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99249"/>
  </entry>
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