Building a malicious package that uses cgo could bypass "#cgo LDFLAGS" validation and cause unexpected code execution at build time, or cause the go command to panic, via crafted quoting in "//go:cgo_ldflag" directives. When "cmd/cgo" generates "_cgo_gotypes.go", it quotes each "#cgo LDFLAGS" argument with strconv.Quote in a "//go:cgo_ldflag" directive, but "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" parsed those directives by splitting on raw quote characters without handling backslash escapes or unquoting the string. This mismatch allowed disallowed linker flags or unvalidated linker search paths to be smuggled past the go command's flag checks and passed to the external linker. In addition, deduplicating LDFLAGS in the go command could panic with an out-of-bounds slice index when a prefix of the flag list matched near the end of the slice. "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" now properly handle backslash-escaped quotes and unquote "//go:cgo_*" pragma strings with strconv.Unquote, and the slice bounds check in processCgoOutputs has been fixed.

Building a malicious package that uses cgo could bypass "#cgo LDFLAGS" validation and cause unexpected code execution at build time, or cause the go command to panic, via crafted quoting in "//go:cgo_ldflag" directives. When "cmd/cgo" generates "_cgo_gotypes.go", it quotes each "#cgo LDFLAGS" argument with strconv.Quote in a "//go:cgo_ldflag" directive, but "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" parsed those directives by splitting on raw quote characters without handling backslash escapes or unquoting the string. This mismatch allowed disallowed linker flags or unvalidated linker search paths to be smuggled past the go command's flag checks and passed to the external linker. In addition, deduplicating LDFLAGS in the go command could panic with an out-of-bounds slice index when a prefix of the flag list matched near the end of the slice. "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" now properly handle backslash-escaped quotes and unquote "//go:cgo_*" pragma strings with strconv.Unquote, and the slice bounds check in processCgoOutputs has been fixed.

go1.26-1.26.11-1.1 on GA media

Affected: Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: golang-1.6, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: golang-1.13, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: golang-1.18, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.10, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: golang-1.13, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: golang-1.16, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: golang-1.18, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: golang-1.8 and 30 more

Building a malicious package that uses cgo could bypass "#cgo LDFLAGS" validation and cause unexpected code execution at build time, or cause the go command to panic, via crafted quoting in "//go:cgo_ldflag" directives. When "cmd/cgo" generates "_cgo_gotypes.go", it quotes each "#cgo LDFLAGS" argument with strconv.Quote in a "//go:cgo_ldflag" directive, but "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" parsed those directives by splitting on raw quote characters without handling backslash escapes or unquoting the string. This mismatch allowed disallowed linker flags or unvalidated linker search paths to be smuggled past the go command's flag checks and passed to the external linker. In addition, deduplicating LDFLAGS in the go command could panic with an out-of-bounds slice index when a prefix of the flag list matched near the end of the slice. "cmd/compile" and "cmd/go" now properly handle backslash-escaped quotes and unquote "//go:cgo_*" pragma strings with strconv.Unquote, and the slice bounds check in processCgoOutputs has been fixed.

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Golang Go ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen.