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  <updated>2026-10-17T16:27:21.363948+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-96627</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-96627</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T16:27:21.365981+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 2.6.0, UpdateUser in backend/api/handlers/users.go sets PasswordHash for any target without comparing caller and target privilege. A holder of delegated users:update permission can submit a password change for the global administrator, replace the administrator password, and authenticate as that account, resulting in complete global administrator account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.0.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-96627"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p</id>
    <title>GHSA-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p — Arcane: Delegated users:update permission allows admin account takeover via password reset (no privilege-hierarchy chec…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T16:27:21.366091+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend/v2</p>
<p>## Summary
A user holding the delegated `users:update` permission can reset the global administrator's password and take over the admin account. `UpdateUser` sets the target user's `PasswordHash` from the request body for ANY target with no comparison of caller-vs-target privilege. Because role assignment and role CRUD are deliberately gated by `RequireGlobalAdmin`, `users:update` is intended to sit BELOW admin (profile management); this finding defeats that separation.</p>
<p>## Root Cause
`UpdateUser` (handler `backend/api/handlers/users.go:317-323`) loads the target by ID and sets `userModel.PasswordHash` from the request body for any user, then `userService.UpdateUser` (`user_service.go:174`) simply `tx.Save`s — with NO actor-vs-target privilege comparison. The only `IsGlobalAdmin` guard (`user_service.go:345`) is a last-admin check inside `DeleteUser`, not the update path. Role assignment / role CRUD are `RequireGlobalAdmin` (`backend/pkg/authz/permissions.go:27-33`), proving `users:update` is intended below admin.</p>
<p>## Impact
Complete administrator account takeover (C:H/I:H/A:H) by any holder of the delegated `users:update` permission.</p>
<p>## Proof of Concept
1. Admin delegates a custom "User Manager" role with `users:update`.
2. `PUT /users/{adminId}` with `{"password":"attacker123"}`.
3. `POST /auth/login {"username":"arcane","password":"attacker123"}` → admin session.</p>
<p>## Attack Chain
1. Action: admin delegates custom role with `users:update`. Guard: role creation is `Require…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pw5q-rjx4-7f7p"/>
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