Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. Prior to 0.106.1, the WorkerStatus gRPC polling path in pkg/repository/durable_events.go passes caller-supplied durable task, node, and branch identifiers to ListSatisfiedEntries without a tenant filter, allowing an authenticated tenant worker that knows another tenant's durable-task UUID to retrieve matching durable event-log records. The UUIDv4 requirement makes exploitation unlikely, and single-tenant deployments are unaffected in practice. This issue is fixed in version 0.106.1.

Affected: Go: github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet

# Cross-tenant disclosure risk on `DurableTask` bidi RPC

This is a low-severity, low-risk cross-tenant data exposure vuln caused by blindly accepting a durable task id, in addition to a list of node and branch ids that identify records in that task's event log, and returning them to the caller via the `handleWorkerStatus` polling path.

# Impact

This advisory requires an attacker to successfully guess a durable task's external uuid belonging to another tenant. External ids are generated uuid v4s (`uuid.New()` in Go), so exploitation requires prior knowledge of a target task UUID through an out-of-band channel. Thus, while the following environments are impacted, there is an extremely low probability it would be exploited.

### Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:

* Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS) * Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance * Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker

Single-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the "victim" and "attacker" tenants would be the same).