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  <updated>2026-09-29T20:38:19.094048+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88975</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-88975</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T20:38:19.117284+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Http4s is a Scala interface for HTTP services. Prior to 0.23.37 and 1.0.0-M48, Ember’s HTTP/2 read loop parses a frame’s 24-bit declared length but waits to buffer the entire payload before comparing it with SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE. An unauthenticated peer can declare a payload near 16 MiB on a connection where Ember advertised 16 KiB and either complete or slowly stream it, causing up to 1024-fold memory amplification per connection before processFrame can reject the frame. The shared H2Connection.readLoop affects withHttp2 servers and clients, while HTTP/2-disabled configurations are unaffected, and the patch rejects oversized frames before buffering their payloads. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.37 and 1.0.0-M48.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-88975"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gq9p-f254-h286</id>
    <title>GHSA-gq9p-f254-h286 — Http4s: Ember HTTP/2 buffers a frame's declared payload before checking SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T20:38:19.117377+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, Maven: org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, Maven: org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3</p>
<p>### Summary
An unauthenticated peer can make Ember's HTTP/2 read loop hold 16 MiB of a single frame in memory on a connection where Ember advertised a 16 KiB limit. The declared length is readable from the frame's first 9 bytes, but it is not compared against SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE until the whole payload has been read into a contiguous buffer. That is 1024x amplification per connection, bounded by the protocol's 24-bit length field rather than by any setting, and at the default maxConnections of 1024 it puts about 16 GiB of heap in reach.</p>
<p>### Details
H2Frame.RawFrame.fromByteVector (ember-core/.../h2/H2Frame.scala:66-69) reads the length, then refuses to produce a frame until 9 + length bytes are present:</p>
<p>```
val length = (bv(2) &amp; 0xff) | ((bv(1) &amp; 0xff) &lt;&lt; 8) | ((bv(0) &amp; 0xff) &lt;&lt; 16)
if (bv.length &gt;= 9 + length) {
```</p>
<p>readNextFrame in H2Connection.readLoop (H2Connection.scala:246-266) reads that None as "need more" and concatenates further socket reads into one accumulator until it is satisfied.</p>
<p>The only check of an inbound frame against the connection's own SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE is in processFrame at H2Connection.scala:534, which cannot run until the frame is assembled. So the value that condemns the frame sits in the accumulator from byte 9 onward and is never consulted. A peer that declares 16777215 and dribbles the payload without finishing gets the same buffering with no reaction at all, since an incomplete frame never reaches processFrame.</p>
<p>RFC 9113 4.2 requir…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gq9p-f254-h286"/>
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