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  <updated>2026-10-23T10:51:26.112375+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86249</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-86249</title>
    <updated>2026-10-23T10:51:26.114648+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403.</p>
<p>Mitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 .</p>
<p>Users who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-86249"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9hx3-v45m-g57x</id>
    <title>GHSA-9hx3-v45m-g57x</title>
    <updated>2026-10-23T10:51:26.114722+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>On a brpc::Server that sets both ServerOptions.auth and ServerOptions.internal_port, the HTTP built-in service exemption on internal_port can be abused to bypass authentication entirely. VerifyHttpRequest() returns true without checking any credential when a built-in service is requested on internal_port, and this verdict is not per - request: verification runs only for the first message of a connection and the result latches the connection. Sending a request such as GET /status to internal_port first authenticates the whole connection, after which every subsequent request dispatched on the same connection is handled without ever calling VerifyHttpRequest(). This lets a remote attacker reach ordinary (non-built-in, non-tabbed) authenticated services without supplying valid credentials whenever the server uses ServerOptions.internal_port together with an Authenticator. The fix restricts internal_port so that it carries only built-in and Tabbed services; requests for ordinary services sent to internal_port are rejected with EPREM / HTTP 403.</p>
<p>Mitigation / Fix: upgrade to 1.18.0 or apply PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3525 .</p>
<p>Users who rely on serving normal services on internal_port must move those requests to the port passed to Server::Start().</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9hx3-v45m-g57x"/>
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