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  <updated>2026-11-10T07:43:49.689283+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85737</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-85737</title>
    <updated>2026-11-10T07:43:49.698621+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Velociraptor is a tool for collecting host-based state information using Velociraptor Query Language (VQL) queries. Prior to 0.77.2, SQLPlugin.Call in vql/parsers/sql/sql.go does not enforce plugin-level FILESYSTEM_READ or NETWORK checks before the mysql and postgres branches pass a caller-controlled connstring to sql.Open, allowing arbitrary outbound database connections. With attacker-controlled MySQL connection options that enable local-infile access, a rogue MySQL server can request files readable by the Velociraptor server process, including root-readable files when that process runs as root. The SQLite file accessor still enforces FILESYSTEM_READ, but a low-privilege analyst with ANY_QUERY can use the zero-permission data accessor and ATTACH DATABASE to create files without the plugin-level check. This issue is fixed in version 0.77.2.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-85737"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9qq5-422f-33c2</id>
    <title>GHSA-9qq5-422f-33c2 — Velociraptor: Low-priv analyst reads arbitrary server files via ungated sql() VQL plugin</title>
    <updated>2026-11-10T07:43:49.698685+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: www.velocidex.com/golang/velociraptor</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `sql()` VQL plugin runs a caller-supplied database driver and connection string with no permission check (`vql/parsers/sql/sql.go:93`, `SQLPlugin.Call`). For `driver='mysql'` or `driver='postgres'` the handle comes from `GetHandleOther` (`sql.go:39`), which passes the connection string straight to Go `database/sql` `sql.Open` (`sql.go:51`) and executes the query (`sql.go:159`).</p>
<p>The plugin declares `FILESYSTEM_READ` only as `Info().Permissions` metadata (`sql.go:219`). That metadata is never consulted at runtime: `metadata.go:19` stores it as a string that only the documentation exporter reads (`api/reflect.go:82-110`). Every sibling network plugin (`http_client`, `netcat`, `s3`, `rsyslog`) calls `CheckAccess(acls.NETWORK)` in its own body; `sql()` calls nothing.</p>
<p>The built-in `analyst` role holds `ANY_QUERY` but not `FILESYSTEM_READ` or `NETWORK` (`acls/roles.go:222`), and reaches this sink through the notebook query API.</p>
<p>Result: a low-priv analyst opens arbitrary outbound TCP connections and, through a rogue MySQL server's `LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE`, reads any file the root-running server can read, including the deployment CA private key.</p>
<p>## Affected</p>
<p>- Velocidex/velociraptor server, `&lt;= v0.77.1` (latest release, 2026-06-23). Identical vulnerable code in `master` HEAD `1961e79` (2026-07-17).
- Confirmed live-exploitable on the official `ghcr.io/velocidex/velociraptor-server:latest` image (build 0.77.1, commit bbe2a58).
- Stock install, default Basic authent…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-9qq5-422f-33c2"/>
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