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  <updated>2026-10-20T03:36:52.534302+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84360</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-84360</title>
    <updated>2026-10-20T03:36:52.535752+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, the HTTP configuration mutation routes require RequireSecureSession, but /mcp and /mcp_message require only ordinary authentication before exposing nginx_config_add and nginx_config_modify. An OTP-enabled user with a normal JWT but no valid X-Secure-Session-ID can therefore create or modify Nginx configuration and trigger reload behavior through MCP, bypassing the intended step-up control. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-84360"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vc32-4gwf-77xp</id>
    <title>GHSA-vc32-4gwf-77xp — Nginx UI: OTP secure-session step-up can be bypassed via MCP configuration tools</title>
    <updated>2026-10-20T03:36:52.535814+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI</p>
<p>### Summary
An OTP-enabled authenticated user who cannot use the HTTP configuration mutation endpoints without a valid secure session can still mutate Nginx configuration through `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` using only ordinary authentication.</p>
<p>### Details
The HTTP configuration mutation surface is explicitly grouped behind `middleware.RequireSecureSession()`. By contrast, the MCP endpoints are exposed with only `middleware.AuthRequired()`. The MCP server exposes configuration mutation tools including `nginx_config_add` and `nginx_config_modify`, so OTP-enabled users gain an alternate path around the intended step-up requirement.</p>
<p>Relevant code paths:
- [api/config/router.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/config/router.go:14)
- [internal/middleware/secure_session.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/middleware/secure_session.go:52)
- [mcp/router.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/router.go:9)
- [mcp/config/config_add.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/config/config_add.go:34)
- [mcp/config/config_modify.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/mcp/config/config_modify.go:55)</p>
<p>This is a security-control bypass rather than a missing feature. The product already established that OTP-enabled users should complete a secure session before high-impact configuration mutations are accepted on the HTTP path.</p>
<p>### PoC
I verified this locally in an isolated environment with a temporary end-to-end harness that exercised the real `/mcp` and `/mcp_message` ro…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vc32-4gwf-77xp"/>
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