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  <updated>2026-11-16T08:54:23.747632+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82391</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-82391</title>
    <updated>2026-11-16T08:54:23.750167+00:00</updated>
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      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The HTTP/2 front-end of the Zephyr HTTP server aliased connection receive state as a scratch output. In subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c, handle_http2_static_fs_resource() passed &amp;client-&gt;data_len as the file_size out-parameter of http_server_find_file(). client-&gt;data_len is the count of unprocessed bytes remaining in the fixed-size per-connection receive buffer client-&gt;buffer[CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE] (256 bytes by default), an invariant every frame handler and the socket receive path rely on. Serving any static file therefore replaced that bounded value with the file's on-disk size, and nothing resets it afterwards.</p>
<p>The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client-&gt;data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client-&gt;cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request.</p>
<p>The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(cl…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-82391"/>
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