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  <updated>2026-09-29T18:21:37.394930+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81868</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-81868</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T18:21:37.427551+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Steeltoe is an open source project that provides a collection of libraries that helps users build cloud-native applications. Prior to 4.3.0, Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate deployments using AddOrgAndSpacePolicies() and UseCertificateAuthorization() trust the public certificate supplied in the X-Client-Cert request header without proving possession of the corresponding private key. Common Cloud Foundry routers do not remove this header from inbound requests. When inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP, an attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space and can reach the application can spoof X-Client-Cert to bypass the SameOrg and SameSpace policies for the certificate validity period. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-81868"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9</id>
    <title>GHSA-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9 — Steeltoe: Header-forwarded client cert lacks proof of private-key possession</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T18:21:37.427672+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> NuGet: Steeltoe.Security.Authorization.Certificate</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>When Steeltoe's certificate-based authorization (`UseCertificateAuthorization`) is configured, the default configuration of the middleware relies on the `X-Client-Cert` HTTP header to identify the client certificate, without verifying private-key possession. This header is not stripped by common Cloud Foundry routers (like Gorouter or Envoy) on inbound requests.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>An attacker who obtains the public certificate of an application instance in the target organization or space can spoof the `X-Client-Cert` header. This allows the attacker to bypass `SameOrg` and `SameSpace` authorization policies, granting unauthorized access to protected endpoints for the duration of the certificate's validity period.</p>
<p>### Affected configuration</p>
<p>- The application uses `AddOrgAndSpacePolicies()` and `UseCertificateAuthorization()` for inter-service authorization.
- Inbound requests are not restricted to a known trusted proxy source IP.
- The application's endpoints are network-accessible to the attacker (e.g., exposed to the internet via a public Cloud Foundry route, or the attacker has access to the internal Cloud Foundry network).</p>
<p>### Mitigations</p>
<p>If an immediate upgrade to a patched version is not possible:</p>
<p>- Restrict `UseCertificateForwarding` to trusted proxy source IPs using `ForwardedHeadersOptions.KnownProxies` and `KnownNetworks`.
- Change the forwarding header to `X-Forwarded-Client-Cert` so that Cloud Foundry Gorouter and Envoy header stripping mechanisms app…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5mq7-rwhj-4fh9"/>
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