<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-20T07:45:21.727431+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://db.gcve.eu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76913</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-76913</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T07:45:21.730033+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>NotrinosERP is an open-source web-based enterprise resource planning system written in PHP and MySQL. From 1.0.0 until 1.1.0, the employee document handler in hrm/manage/employees.php allows an authenticated user with SA_EMPLOYEE permission to submit doc_file through tab_documents() and stores the raw client filename, including an executable extension, under company/0/documents/employees/ without extension, MIME, or content validation. Uploading a PHP file places executable content beneath the web root, where requesting the stored file results in server-side code execution. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-76913"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qv4m-m73m-8hj7</id>
    <title>GHSA-qv4m-m73m-8hj7 — NotrinosERP: Authenticated arbitrary file upload leads to remote code execution via HRM employee "Documents" (doc_file)</title>
    <updated>2026-11-20T07:45:21.730103+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: notrinos/notrinos-erp</p>
<p>#### Summary
An authenticated user with the HR "Manage Employees" permission (`SA_EMPLOYEE`) can upload a
file with an arbitrary extension through the employee **Documents** tab. The handler writes the
raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web-served directory with no extension,
MIME, or content validation, so a `.php` file is stored under the web root and executes as code,
yielding remote code execution on the server.</p>
<p>#### Details
The document-upload branch in `hrm/manage/employees.php` (function `tab_documents()`) moves the
uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:</p>
<p>```php
// hrm/manage/employees.php -&gt; tab_documents()  (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)
$upload_dir = company_path().'/documents/employees';
if (!file_exists($upload_dir))
    mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);
$file_path = $upload_dir.'/'.$employee_id.'_'.time().'_'.$_FILES['doc_file']['name'];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['doc_file']['tmp_name'], $file_path)) { ... }
```</p>
<p>There is **no** extension allow-list, `getimagesize()`, MIME check, or content inspection on this
path. Contrast this with the profile-photo (`pic`) upload in the *same file*, which validates image
type/extension/size, and with core `includes/ui/attachment.inc`, which deliberately generates a
random extension-less name (`uniqid()`) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be
trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.</p>
<p>Reachability of the written file:
- `co…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qv4m-m73m-8hj7"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
