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  <updated>2026-09-29T20:38:27.964225+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69216</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-69216</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T20:38:27.980735+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Http4s is a Scala interface for HTTP services. Prior to 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47, Ember’s chunk decoder trims the chunk-size token and accepts leading plus or minus signs instead of requiring one or more hexadecimal digits followed by the required CRLF. When an intermediary forwards chunked data without re-encoding and interprets malformed chunk boundaries differently, an unauthenticated attacker can create TE.TE request smuggling that bypasses intermediary controls, poisons caches, or hijacks the request queue. The same response-path leniency can enable response smuggling against an ember-client used as a gateway when the upstream is malicious or compromised. This issue is fixed in versions 0.23.35 and 1.0.0-M47.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69216"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-jrpm-956j-96jg</id>
    <title>GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg — Http4s: Ember chunk parser lenience (TE.TE request smuggling)</title>
    <updated>2026-09-29T20:38:27.980805+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, Maven: org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, Maven: org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Ember's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>### Server</p>
<p>Request smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently</p>
<p>- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.
- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.
- Request queue hijack:</p>
<p>### Client</p>
<p>ember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.</p>
<p>## Preconditions</p>
<p>- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)
- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary
- Malicious or compromised upstream (client)
- Intermediary or upstream forwards chunked bodies without re-encoding and disagrees with Ember on `+` prefix, `-` prefix, or leading and trailing octets rather than rejecting.</p>
<p>## Workarounds</p>
<p>- Intermediary strictly rejects malformed chunk sizes
- Intermediary buffe…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-jrpm-956j-96jg"/>
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