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  <updated>2026-11-19T10:54:51.641011+00:00</updated>
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    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69158</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-69158</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T10:54:51.642318+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. Prior to 0.40.3, unauthenticated requests to /bookmark can supply a url that server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs passes through fetch_data to fetch_body. Endpoint dispatch in lib/src/db.rs invokes the handler before check_read, and lib/src/client/helpers.rs previously checked only that the URL began with HTTP, without restricting loopback, private, link-local, DNS-rebinding, or redirect targets. The handler reflects fetched content in returned resource fields, making this a full-response server-side request forgery that can expose internal services and plain-GET cloud metadata. The short request timeout limits slow targets, and metadata services requiring a separate token request are outside the demonstrated GET-only path. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69158"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-ff87-73jp-f3v4</id>
    <title>GHSA-ff87-73jp-f3v4 — Atomic Server: Unauthenticated full-response SSRF in Atomic-Server /bookmark endpoint</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T10:54:51.642385+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: atomic-server</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Atomic-Server exposes a `GET /bookmark` endpoint that fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side, parses the response, and reflects the fetched content back to the caller. The endpoint requires no authentication and performs no authorization of its own, and the underlying fetch helper applies no allow-list or private-IP deny-list. An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can force it to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests to internal-only hosts (loopback services, internal admin panels, link-local cloud-metadata) and read the response body back. This is a full-response SSRF, not a blind one.</p>
<p>## Root cause (source trace)</p>
<p>1. The bookmark endpoint is registered unconditionally for every server: `server/src/appstate.rs:69` (`store.add_endpoint(plugins::bookmark::bookmark_endpoint())`).
2. An unauthenticated caller on the standard GET route becomes `ForAgent::Public`: `server/src/helpers.rs:168-183` (`get_client_agent`).
3. In `get_resource_extended`, when the subject matches an endpoint path the function returns via `call_endpoint` BEFORE the `hierarchy::check_read` authorization call: `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1017` (`if is_endpoint { return self.call_endpoint(...) }`, and `check_read` sits just after at :1017, never reached).
4. `call_endpoint` performs no authorization itself; it only matches the path and invokes the handler: `lib/src/db.rs:662-706`.
5. The bookmark handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`) and fetches the `url` query p…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-ff87-73jp-f3v4"/>
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