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  <updated>2026-11-19T10:55:08.550882+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69156</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-69156</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T10:55:08.554970+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, the Commit application path in lib/src/commit.rs allows an authenticated Agent to assign the server-managed internalId property to an owned resource without character validation. The /download handler in server/src/handlers/download.rs passes that value to filesystem path construction and NamedFile::open without sanitization, containment validation, or a File-class check, so traversal or absolute paths can read files available to the server process. Reading the server configuration can expose the root Agent private key and allow root impersonation with full read, write, and delete access to server data. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69156"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8vc4-8hjq-988p</id>
    <title>GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p — Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent privat…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T10:55:08.555071+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: atomic-server</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path — `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` — with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`.</p>
<p>## Affected component</p>
<p>- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` — `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check.
- `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist.</p>
<p>## Steps to Reproduce</p>
<p>Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately).</p>
<p>1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path — sign the Commit and `POST /commit…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8vc4-8hjq-988p"/>
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