<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-19T10:54:05.306228+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://db.gcve.eu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69155</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-69155</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T10:54:05.312777+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Atomic Server is an open source headless CMS and real-time database. From 0.30.0 until 0.40.3, an authenticated Agent with folder write access can use POST /upload to store HTML or SVG content that GET /download/{path} serves from the application origin through server/src/handlers/download.rs. The response sets Content-Disposition: inline and lacks forced attachment handling and X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, allowing the browser to render the uploaded active content as the application. When a victim opens the link, the script can access the JavaScript-readable atomic_session cookie and the Agent private key in same-origin IndexedDB, enabling persistent account impersonation. This issue is fixed in version 0.40.3.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-69155"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x277-3wcg-g9r2</id>
    <title>GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2 — Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T10:54:05.312918+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: atomic-server</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Files uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `&lt;script&gt;`; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the `atomic_session` cookie is set via `document.cookie` (not HttpOnly) and the Agent's Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (`browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts`), the script exfiltrates the private key → **permanent account takeover**.</p>
<p>## Affected component</p>
<p>- `server/src/handlers/upload.rs` — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension.
- `server/src/handlers/download.rs:65` — `NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req)` with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in `server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs`.</p>
<p>## Steps to Reproduce</p>
<p>Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder.</p>
<p>1. Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers):</p>
<p>```http
POST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-publ…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x277-3wcg-g9r2"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
