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  <updated>2026-11-21T09:31:52.889577+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63202</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-63202</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T09:31:52.890868+00:00</updated>
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        <p>netty-incubator-codec-ohttp implements Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP) gateway and client functionality using Netty. Prior to 0.0.23.Final, BinaryHttpParser.readFieldSection in codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java loops while fieldSectionLength is nonzero and relies on disabled-by-default assertions to require BinaryHttpParser.readFieldLine to return a value and consume bytes. A corrupt field line can consume more bytes than its understated declared section length and drive the counter negative, or a truncated field line can return without consuming data and leave the parser in the same state. An unauthenticated OHTTP peer can encrypt such Binary HTTP content under the gateway public configuration, reach OHttpRequestResponseContext.ContentDecoder.decodeChunk, and permanently pin a Netty event-loop thread at full CPU before application business logic. Multiple requests can exhaust the event-loop group and deny service until restart. This issue is fixed in version 0.0.23.Final.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-63202"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4899-mpch-38p3</id>
    <title>GHSA-4899-mpch-38p3 — netty-incubator-codec-ohttp BinaryHttpParser: Unauthenticated CPU-exhaustion DoS via infinite loop in field-section dec…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T09:31:52.890940+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-bhttp</p>
<p># BinaryHttpParser: Unauthenticated CPU-exhaustion DoS via infinite loop in field-section decoding</p>
<p>- **ID:** BHTTP-LOOP-001
- **Severity:** High
- **CVSS v3.1:** 7.5 — `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`
- **CWE:** CWE-835 (Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition) — secondary CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption)
- **Affected component:** `codec-bhttp` → `io.netty.incubator.codec.bhttp.BinaryHttpParser#readFieldSection`, file `codec-bhttp/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/bhttp/BinaryHttpParser.java:619-626`
- **Affected version:** netty-incubator-codec-ohttp HEAD `d3f2b49` (release `0.0.22.Final` + 3 commits). The loop has existed since the parser was introduced and is present in the latest code; all published advisory fixes are already applied.
- **Reachable from:** `io.netty.incubator.codec.ohttp.OHttpRequestResponseContext$ContentDecoder#decodeChunk` (`codec-ohttp/.../OHttpRequestResponseContext.java:214`), i.e. the auto-wired OHTTP server **and** client codecs.
- **Confidence:** High (empirically reproduced hang + thread dump against the unmodified parser).</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`BinaryHttpParser` decodes Binary HTTP (RFC 9292) messages. An OHTTP gateway/client built on this library feeds the **decrypted** OHTTP body straight into `BinaryHttpParser.parse(...)`. The field-section decoding loop terminates only on the exact condition `fieldSectionLength != 0` and relies on a Java `assert` to guarantee forward progress. Because (a) the loop counter can be driven…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4899-mpch-38p3"/>
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