fkie_cve-2026-63116

2026-10-02T23:08:42.644760+00:00

deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.

GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w — deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes

2026-10-02T23:08:42.644840+00:00

Affected: npm: @deepstream/server

## Summary

The `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` action is not registered in the Valve permission system's `RULES_MAP` (`src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts`). When `ConfigPermission.canPerformAction()` is called for a PATCH_MULTI message, `getRulesForMessage()` returns `null` because the action is missing from the map. This triggers an unconditional allow (`callback(..., null, true)`), completely bypassing all configured Valve permission rules.

Any authenticated user — regardless of their configured permissions — can write arbitrary data to any record using the PATCH_MULTI action.

## Root Cause

In `src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts` lines 38-54, the `RULES_MAP[TOPIC.RECORD].actions` dictionary maps record actions to permission rule types. The actions registered include: SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBEANDHEAD, SUBSCRIBEANDREAD, READ, HEAD, LISTEN, CREATE, UPDATE, PATCH, NOTIFY, DELETE, ERASE. However, `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` is **absent** from this map.

When `getRulesForMessage()` at line 86-99 encounters an action not in the map, it returns `null`. In `config-permission.ts` at line 88-93, when `ruleSpecification === null`, the callback is invoked with `true` (allow) unconditionally.

## Attack Chain

1. Attacker authenticates with any valid credentials (even a minimal-privilege user) 2. Attacker sends a WebSocket message: `{topic: RECORD, action: PATCH_MULTI, name: "admin/secret-record", parsedData: [{path: "role", data: "admin"}]}` 3. `message-processor.ts:68` invo…

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fkie_cve-2026-63116

GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w — deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes