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  <updated>2026-09-28T21:57:46.313168+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62368</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-62368</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T21:57:46.338639+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Snipe-IT is an IT asset/license management system. Prior to 8.7.0, a user with the customfields.create permission can store markup in CustomField.name, and app/Presenters/AssetPresenter.php assigns that value as an unescaped bootstrap-table header title. When another user opens an asset-list page associated with the fieldset, the stored markup executes on page load in that user's Snipe-IT session. This can expose same-origin data and perform authenticated actions with the victim's privileges, including privilege escalation when a superuser views the affected list. This issue is fixed in version 8.7.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62368"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-p9h3-gvpq-5539</id>
    <title>GHSA-p9h3-gvpq-5539 — Snipe-IT: Stored XSS via Custom Field name in asset-list column headers</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T21:57:46.338745+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: snipe/snipe-it</p>
<p>### Impact
A user with the "customfields.create" permission can store HTML/JS in a Custom Field name, which is later rendered as an asset-list column title WITHOUT escaping at app/Presenters/AssetPresenter.php line 364 ('title' =&gt; $field-&gt;name) and injected into the table header by the bundled bootstrap-table plugin. It executes for anyone who opens an asset list (e.g. /hardware), including superusers, on page load with no interaction. Since "customfields.create" can be granted to non-superusers, a lower-privileged user gets script execution in a superuser's session -&gt; privilege escalation.</p>
<p>STEPS TO REPRODUCE
1. As a user with "customfields.create", create a Custom Field named: `&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;`
2. Add the field to a fieldset that is associated with an asset model.
3. Open `/hardware` -&gt; the payload executes on load.</p>
<p>DEMONSTRATED IMPACT
An account holding ONLY "customfields.create" (HTTP 403 on /users) planted a payload that, when a superuser opened /hardware, issued an authenticated request in that session and granted the attacker's own account the "superuser" permission (afterwards: GET /users = 200, isSuperUser() = true).</p>
<p>ROOT CAUSE
- Blade {{ }} encodes the data-columns attribute, but the browser decodes it back before bootstrap-table reads the title; bootstrap-table then renders the header title unescaped because its table-level "escape" option defaults to false and is never enabled. (The per-column 'escape' =&gt; true covers cell values, not the header tit…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-p9h3-gvpq-5539"/>
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