https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-11-05T07:36:14.746576+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@gcve.eu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-62331 fkie_cve-2026-62331 2026-11-05T07:36:14.749377+00:00

praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.

 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-48v2-6jcm-fc99 GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 — praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored… 2026-11-05T07:36:14.749462+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor

### Impact

A remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (`praktor-wk-<workspace>`, mounted at `/workspace/agent`), escaping the documented `uploads/` directory.

The attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (`internal/telegram/bot.go`, at both upload sites) and resolved with `path.Join`, which collapses `../` sequences. A filename like `../../../CLAUDE.md` resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside `uploads/`.

Because the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside `uploads/` lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. `CLAUDE.md`, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under `/workspace/agent`. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).

### Reachability

By default the bot has no user allowlist (`allow_from: []` means "allow all"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.

### Affected versions

Through `v0.9.0` (and HEAD `3902d29`).

### Patched versions

`v0.9.1`, containing PR #228.

### Workarounds

Restrict `telegram.allow_from` to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to `v…