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  <updated>2026-10-02T12:15:50.980468+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61670</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-61670</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T12:15:51.007099+00:00</updated>
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        <p>microsandbox is an easy, fast, local-first microVM runtime and library. Prior to 0.5.10, sdk/rust/lib/runtime/spawn.rs serializes NetworkConfig secret values into the --network-config argument and passes per-sandbox secrets through repeated --env arguments accepted by crates/cli/lib/sandbox_cmd.rs. Other local users or co-resident processes can read these values through the host process table, including /proc process command lines on Linux and process listings on Linux and macOS, for the lifetime of the sandbox. Exploitation does not require code execution inside the sandbox or access to the spawning user's session, and can disclose host-side API keys, tokens, and environment secrets on shared hosts, CI runners, and developer systems. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.10.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-61670"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m8f5-rh7h-vgg3</id>
    <title>GHSA-m8f5-rh7h-vgg3 — microsandbox: Secret values exposed in world-readable process arguments</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T12:15:51.007216+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: microsandbox</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>When the SDK spawns a sandbox, the `msb sandbox` child process receives the full network configuration as an inline `--network-config &lt;json&gt;` command-line argument, and any per-sandbox environment as repeated `--env KEY=VALUE` arguments. On Linux a process's arguments are world-readable via `/proc/&lt;pid&gt;/cmdline`, and on both Linux and macOS they are visible to other local processes via `ps`. Because the network configuration carries the real secret values used for host-side secret substitution, any unprivileged local user (or any process running as a different user on the same host) can read those secrets directly out of the process listing for as long as the sandbox is running. This defeats the "secrets that can't leak" guarantee for the host side of the boundary.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The SDK serializes the entire `NetworkConfig`, including the real (non-placeholder) secret values, and pushes it onto the child argv, in `sdk/rust/lib/runtime/spawn.rs` near line 1241:</p>
<p>```rust
let net_json = serde_json::to_string(&amp;config.network)
     .expect("failed to serialize network config");
args.push(OsString::from("--network-config"));
args.push(OsString::from(net_json));   // secrets land in argv here
```</p>
<p>The CLI accepts it only as an inline string and parses it with `serde_json::from_str`, so there is no off-argv channel today. The field is declared at `crates/cli/lib/sandbox_cmd.rs` line 152 and parsed near line 234:</p>
<p>```rust
/// Network configuration as JSON.
pub network_conf…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-m8f5-rh7h-vgg3"/>
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