<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-01T22:43:01.120120+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://db.gcve.eu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58271</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-58271</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T22:43:01.147788+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, `POST /api/app/sync/register` accepts credentials and a TOTP code to register a desktop sync client. On a failed TOTP, `SyncClientsManager.register()` calls `updateAccesses(user, ip, false)`, which hits a freeze branch that writes `passwordAttempts` back unchanged. The counter never reaches `USER_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS` (10) and the lockout gate never fires. A successful guess returns a `{clientId, clientToken}` pair. The token can be exchanged via `POST /api/app/sync/auth/cookie` for a full JWT. While the code is valid, the attacker can also call `POST /api/auth/2fa/disable` to permanently remove MFA. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-58271"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-274f-6w77-8qm9</id>
    <title>GHSA-274f-6w77-8qm9 — @sync-in/server vulnerable to TOTP Brute-Force via `POST /api/app/sync/register`</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T22:43:01.147898+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: @sync-in/server</p>
<p>**Affected component:** Sync-in Server v2.3.0, `POST /api/app/sync/register`.</p>
<p>**Required attacker capability:** Valid login and password for a TOTP-enabled account with desktop sync permission.</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`POST /api/app/sync/register` accepts credentials and a TOTP code to register a desktop sync client. In the vulnerable version, on a failed TOTP attempt, `SyncClientsManager.register()` called `updateAccesses(user, ip, false)`, which hit a freeze branch that wrote `passwordAttempts` back unchanged. The counter never reached `USER_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS` (10), so the account lockout gate never fired for repeated TOTP failures through this endpoint.</p>
<p>A successful TOTP guess registers a sync client and returns a `{clientId, clientToken}` pair, provided the account has the required desktop app permission and the registration payload is valid. The token can then be exchanged via `POST /api/app/sync/auth/cookie` for an authenticated session. While the guessed TOTP code is still valid, and because the attacker already knows the password, the attacker can also call `POST /api/auth/2fa/disable` to remove MFA.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The endpoint is declared at `sync.controller.ts` line 71. `@AuthTokenSkip()` bypasses the bearer-token guard, so the route is reachable without any prior session:
```typescript
@Post(SYNC_ROUTE.REGISTER)
@AuthTokenSkip()
register(@Body() syncClientRegistrationDto: SyncClientRegistrationDto, @Req() req: FastifyRequest): Promise&lt;SyncClientAuthRegistration&gt; {
  retu…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-274f-6w77-8qm9"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
