PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.2 to before version 4.6.59, praisonai.bots.HTTPApproval renders pending tool approval arguments directly into the approval dashboard HTML. An attacker-controlled tool argument can inject JavaScript into that page. When a human opens the approval URL to inspect the risky tool request, the script runs in the dashboard origin and can POST to the same request's /approve/{request_id}/decide endpoint, causing HTTPApproval to return approved=True. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.59.

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

# HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools

## Summary

`praisonai.bots.HTTPApproval` renders pending tool approval arguments directly into the approval dashboard HTML. An attacker-controlled tool argument can inject JavaScript into that page. When a human opens the approval URL to inspect the risky tool request, the script runs in the dashboard origin and can POST to the same request's `/approve/{request_id}/decide` endpoint, causing `HTTPApproval` to return `approved=True`.

The local PoV uses a harmless `touch /tmp/prai010 #` command prefix and stops at the approval decision. It does not execute the command.

## Affected Versions

Proposed affected range: `>= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.57`.

Validated affected:

- current head `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` (`v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab`) - `v4.5.2` - `v4.5.3` - `v4.5.124` - `v4.5.126` - `v4.5.128` - `v4.6.10` - `v4.6.56` - `v4.6.57`

`v4.5.0` and `v4.5.1` do not contain the HTTPApproval backend.

## Impact

An attacker who can influence an agent task or prompt enough to produce a dangerous tool call can embed a short XSS payload in the tool argument. When the human approver opens the HTTP approval page, the script can approve the pending dangerous tool call before the human explicitly clicks Approve or Deny.

This bypasses the human-in-the-loop approval boundary for dangerous tools such as `execute_command`, `execute_code`, `delete_file`, or other tools gat…

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

# HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools

## Summary

`praisonai.bots.HTTPApproval` renders pending tool approval arguments directly into the approval dashboard HTML. An attacker-controlled tool argument can inject JavaScript into that page. When a human opens the approval URL to inspect the risky tool request, the script runs in the dashboard origin and can POST to the same request's `/approve/{request_id}/decide` endpoint, causing `HTTPApproval` to return `approved=True`.

The local PoV uses a harmless `touch /tmp/prai010 #` command prefix and stops at the approval decision. It does not execute the command.

## Affected Versions

Proposed affected range: `>= 4.5.2, <= 4.6.57`.

Validated affected:

- current head `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` (`v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab`) - `v4.5.2` - `v4.5.3` - `v4.5.124` - `v4.5.126` - `v4.5.128` - `v4.6.10` - `v4.6.56` - `v4.6.57`

`v4.5.0` and `v4.5.1` do not contain the HTTPApproval backend.

## Impact

An attacker who can influence an agent task or prompt enough to produce a dangerous tool call can embed a short XSS payload in the tool argument. When the human approver opens the HTTP approval page, the script can approve the pending dangerous tool call before the human explicitly clicks Approve or Deny.

This bypasses the human-in-the-loop approval boundary for dangerous tools such as `execute_command`, `execute_code`, `delete_file`, or other tools gat…