https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-07T17:52:34.539795+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@gcve.eu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54688 fkie_cve-2026-54688 2026-10-07T17:52:34.567504+00:00

mcp-searxng is a Model Context Protocol server that gives AI assistants web search and URL-reading capabilities through SearXNG. Prior to 1.2.0, web_url_read passes a caller-supplied URL to the server-side fetch path while assertUrlAllowed() in src/url-reader.ts runs only when MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is enabled, even though MCP_HTTP_HARDEN is disabled by default in src/http-security.ts. In the default configuration, an attacker who influences the URL selected by a user or AI agent can make the server fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoint resources and return their contents into the model context. file:// URLs remain rejected, and the separate DNS-resolution and redirect-validation bypasses are outside this record. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.0.

 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q87f-qc2r-2gw4 GHSA-q87f-qc2r-2gw4 — SearXNG MCP Server is Vulnerable to SSRF in web_url_read: the internal-address guard is disabled by default (MCP_HTTP_H… 2026-10-07T17:52:34.567601+00:00

Affected: npm: mcp-searxng

Ref: https://github.com/ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng/issues/87#issuecomment-4645453694

### Summary The web_url_read tool fetches a caller-supplied URL server-side and converts it to markdown. An SSRF guard (assertUrlAllowed, which blocks private/loopback/metadata addresses) exists but runs only when MCP_HTTP_HARDEN=true, which is off by default. So in the default configuration there is no internal-address filtering, and an attacker who can influence the URL can make the server fetch internal services and cloud metadata and return their content. Confirmed on 1.1.0 (default config): web_url_read fetched a local internal sentinel and returned its content.

### Details dist/index.js (around lines 90-101): web_url_read calls fetchAndConvertToMarkdown on the caller URL. dist/url-reader.js (around lines 44-52): assertUrlAllowed performs the private-IP/loopback check, but only when the hardening flag is set; dist/http-security.js (around line 11) defaults MCP_HTTP_HARDEN to off. With the default config the check is skipped entirely. Even when enabled, the check is literal-hostname based with no DNS-rebinding or redirect re-check (the fetch follows redirects). file:// is rejected, so this is HTTP/HTTPS SSRF.

### PoC Re-validated on mcp-searxng 1.1.0 over MCP stdio in the default configuration (MCP_HTTP_HARDEN not set): ``` tools: searxng_web_search, web_url_read web_url_read({ url: "http://127.0.0.1:<port>/internal" }) -> server fetched the internal sentinel; SSRF: CONFIRMED ``` The…