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  <updated>2026-10-15T03:29:57.663119+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54641</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54641</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T03:29:57.681600+00:00</updated>
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        <p>OpenRemote is an open-source internet-of-things platform. Prior to 1.24.2, the get, getUserClientRoles, and getUserRealmRoles methods in manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java authorize callers with the read:admin role without confirming that the target UUID belongs to the requested and authenticated realm. A realm administrator can supply a user identifier from another tenant or the master realm and retrieve that user's profile, client roles, and realm roles, breaking tenant isolation and exposing privileged account information. This issue is fixed in version 1.24.2.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54641"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xqr9-4wvv-gvch</id>
    <title>GHSA-xqr9-4wvv-gvch — OpenRemote has Cross-Realm User Information Disclosure in UserResourceImpl</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T03:29:57.681668+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: io.openremote:openremote-manager</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>A realm admin of tenant B can read the profile, client roles, and realm roles of any user in any other realm (including the master realm) by supplying the target user's UUID in the REST API path. Three read endpoints in UserResourceImpl check whether the caller holds the read:admin role but omit a check that the target user belongs to the caller's own realm. The vulnerability enables cross-tenant user enumeration and privilege-level reconnaissance. On a multi-tenant deployment the master realm administrator account is reachable from any tenant realm admin.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The affected file is manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java.</p>
<p>Three methods are missing an authenticated-realm guard:</p>
<p>get (line 102):</p>
<p>public User get(RequestParams requestParams, String realm, String userId) {
        boolean hasAdminReadRole = hasResourceRole(ClientRole.READ_ADMIN.getValue(), Constants.KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID);
        if (!hasAdminReadRole &amp;&amp; !Objects.equals(getUserId(), userId)) {
            throw new ForbiddenException("...");
        }
        try {
            return identityService.getIdentityProvider().getUser(userId);
        } ...
    }</p>
<p>The realm path parameter is accepted but never used. getUser(userId) delegates to getUserByIdFromDb(persistenceService, userId) which queries the database by UUID with no realm filter.</p>
<p>getUserClientRoles (line 294):</p>
<p>public String[] getUserClientRoles(RequestParams requestParams, String realm,…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-xqr9-4wvv-gvch"/>
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