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  <updated>2026-10-02T03:54:32.904275+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54542</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54542</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T03:54:32.930946+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.</p>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54542"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p</id>
    <title>GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p — nimiq-primitives: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof</title>
    <updated>2026-10-02T03:54:32.931052+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: nimiq-primitives</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>A malicious peer acting as a state-sync source can crash a syncing node with a crafted `TrieChunk` whose proof contains a `TrieNodeChild` whose `suffix`, when concatenated with the parent key via `KeyNibbles::Add`, exceeds the fixed 63-byte backing array. `Add` (`primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs:332` / `:341`) indexes `bytes[self.bytes_len()..self.bytes_len() + other.bytes_len()]` with no combined-length check, causing an out-of-bounds slice panic (both the even- and odd-length branches).</p>
<p>`KeyNibbles` deserialization validates only the individual `length &lt;= 126`, not the combined parent + suffix length. The panic occurs at `put_chunk` → `child.key()` → `is_stump()` → `+`, i.e. **before** `proof.verify()`, so no valid proof is required. As with the related `child_index` issue, exploitation requires being the victim's sync peer during state sync, and the resulting crash is transient (the node restarts and re-syncs).</p>
<p>Affected: core-rs-albatross &lt;= 1.5.1 (`nimiq-primitives`).</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in **1.6.0** via https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3790 (commit `eabfc3e2`), which guards key-nibble concatenation against exceeding the maximum length instead of indexing out of bounds.</p>
<p>### Workarounds</p>
<p>None other than syncing only from trusted peers. Upgrade to 1.6.0.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p"/>
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