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  <updated>2026-11-13T22:48:50.155125+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-54144</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-54144</title>
    <updated>2026-11-13T22:48:50.156019+00:00</updated>
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        <p>OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDisplayMedia without a live user gesture. Instead of rejecting the request, the shim falls through to native Chromium capture behavior, and the embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker. If OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission and an attacker obtains JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin, the attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream without a new user gesture. The stream can expose chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, one-time codes, and other visible desktop information. The separate direct screen_share_begin_session IPC path failing origin validation does not prevent exploitation through getDisplayMedia. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.</p>
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