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  <updated>2026-11-21T04:57:17.137439+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129304</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-129304</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T04:57:17.138687+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 1.0.0 until 3.13.0, _extract_from_forwarded_header() in guard_core/utils.py returns the selected X-Forwarded-For entry without validating that it is an IP address. In deployments configured with trusted_proxies where the selected entry is attacker-controlled, the arbitrary client_ip string reaches BehaviorTracker in guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py and is interpolated into Redis key names and blocking KEYS glob patterns. Glob metacharacters can cause one request to count other clients' behavior events, embedded separators can disturb key parsing, and rotating identities can create unbounded keys while repeatedly scanning the shared Redis keyspace. A non-IP identity can also reach a ban action and cause an uncaught validation error. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129304"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gm9r-hvc9-96gv</id>
    <title>GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv — Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob…</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T04:57:17.138764+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: guard-core</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`_extract_from_forwarded_header()` (`guard_core/utils.py:172-181` in 3.12.0; `:179` on master `08780f1`) returns the selected `X-Forwarded-For` entry **without any `ipaddress` validation**. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes `client_ip` and flows into `BehaviorTracker` (`guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102`), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a `KEYS` glob pattern:</p>
<p>```python
key = f"behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}"
await self.redis_handler.set_key("behavior_usage", f"{key}:{current_time}", "1", ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f"behavior_usage:{key}:*"
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern)      # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace
```</p>
<p>Same shape in `track_return_pattern()` (`behavior_handler.py:135-142`). `redis_handler.keys()` maps to the blocking Redis `KEYS` command (`guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275`).</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Three consequences, in increasing severity:</p>
<p>1. **Cross-client counter contamination.** `X-Forwarded-For: *` makes the glob match *every* client's behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client `9.9.9.9` hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying `XFF: *` issued the pattern `behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*`, counted the victim's events, and tripped the rule on its **first** request. An embedded `:` also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (`behavior…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gm9r-hvc9-96gv"/>
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