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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-11-17T05:05:23.407099+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-736f-c93q-9fwx</id>
    <title>GHSA-736f-c93q-9fwx — russh try_sign: asynchronous confirmation can sign after agent lock</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T05:05:23.409375+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: russh</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>In russh `0.65.0`, a sign request for a confirmation-constrained key can retain
and use the private key after another connection locks the agent. `try_sign()`
snapshots an `Arc&lt;PrivateKey&gt;` before awaiting `Agent::confirm()` and does not
revalidate the shared lock state after the await. An agent-forwarding peer can
therefore obtain a signature while the agent is locked and every new request is
being rejected.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The agent's lock and key stores are shared by all connections. `respond()` reads
the lock state once, then dispatches a sign request:</p>
<p>```rust
let is_locked = {
    // ... read the shared lock ...
};</p>
<p>// ...
Some((&amp;13, mut r))
    if !is_locked &amp;&amp; agentref.confirm_request(MessageType::Sign).await =&gt;
{
    let agent = self.agent.take().ok_or(Error::AgentFailure)?;
    let (agent, signed) = self.try_sign(agent, &amp;mut r, writebuf).await?;
```</p>
<p>In `try_sign()`, russh clones the private key from the shared store and drops the
store lock before awaiting the asynchronous confirmation callback:</p>
<p>```rust
let key = {
    let blob = Bytes::decode(r)?;
    let k = self.keys.0.read().or(Err(Error::AgentFailure))?;
    if let Some((key, _, constraints)) = k.get(&amp;blob.to_vec()) {
        if constraints.contains(&amp;Constraint::Confirm) {
            needs_confirm = true;
        }
        key.clone()
    } else {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
};</p>
<p>let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;
    if !ok {…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-736f-c93q-9fwx"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128088</id>
    <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-128088</title>
    <updated>2026-11-17T05:05:23.409550+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh</p>
<p>russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to version 0.65.1, try_sign() captures an Arc&lt;PrivateKey&gt; before awaiting Agent::confirm() and does not revalidate the shared lock state or key presence after the await. This is a distinct residual defect in the remediation for CVE-2026-116794. A peer, including a remote SSH server using agent forwarding, can begin a confirmation-constrained signature request while the agent is unlocked and receive the signature after another connection locks the agent if the stale confirmation returns true. New post-lock requests are rejected and private key material is not disclosed, but the pending operation bypasses the current lock state. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.1.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-128088"/>
  </entry>
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