compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. From 0.32.0 until 0.33.0, compose-lint's incomplete remediation for .env secret disclosure checks the 20,000-finding limit before replacing resolved values with their variable references. A pull request can combine a secret-referencing image field with aliased content that produces more than 20,000 findings, causing the early-stop path to emit already graded findings with the resolved secret value in text, JSON, SARIF, and Code Scanning output. Exploitation requires a workflow that writes secrets into the sibling .env and lints untrusted changes, and the run exits 2 unless --allow-partial-coverage is used. This issue is fixed in version 0.33.0.

Affected: PyPI: compose-lint, GitHub Actions: tmatens/compose-lint

### Impact

This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-jf3h-8jvx-vcrg. 0.32.0 made findings quote the `${NAME}` a sibling `.env` filled in, instead of its value. The same release added a stop at 20,000 findings per document, and that stop is checked before the quoting step. A run that hits it reports the findings graded so far with the resolved values still in them, in text, JSON and SARIF output. That happens with or without `--allow-partial-coverage`.

The attack is the one GHSA-jf3h-8jvx-vcrg describes. In a CI workflow that writes secrets into the `.env` beside the Compose file, a pull request changes a line to `image: "${DB_PASSWORD}"`. It also pushes the document past 20,000 findings, which a few hundred lines can do, because an aliased list is graded once for each service that uses it. The secret's value is quoted in a finding that reaches the job log, the JSON output and the SARIF uploaded to Code Scanning. GitHub masks registered secrets in the job log, but not in uploaded JSON or SARIF artifacts or in Code Scanning alert text. The run exits 2, or 0 with `--allow-partial-coverage`, after the output has been written.

The preconditions are the same as for GHSA-jf3h-8jvx-vcrg. The workflow writes secrets into the `.env` beside the Compose file *and* runs on pull requests from authors who should not see them, such as a `pull_request_target` workflow that lints the pull request's files. Pull requests from forks normally run without secrets, so the common setup is not exposed. T…