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  <updated>2026-11-02T16:31:23.403566+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118249</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-118249</title>
    <updated>2026-11-02T16:31:23.422103+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 13.0.0 until 13.1.0, Highcharts builds series data columns by using point option keys directly as column IDs. Own enumerable __proto__ and constructor keys from parsed point objects can therefore direct integer-indexed writes to Object.prototype or the Object constructor. The inherited values affect reads and for-in enumeration across the page and can disrupt rendering or alter consuming application behavior without user interaction beyond rendering the chart. This issue is fixed in 13.1.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-118249"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gfvx-2c2g-38wq</id>
    <title>GHSA-gfvx-2c2g-38wq — Highcharts: series column construction writes to Object.prototype</title>
    <updated>2026-11-02T16:31:23.422179+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: highcharts</p>
<p>### Impact
When series columns are built from point objects, the point option keys are used directly as data column ids, so the write that populates a column reaches `Object.prototype` and the `Object` constructor. Keys named `__proto__` and `constructor` survive `JSON.parse` as own enumerable properties, so an attacker who controls the point objects can set integer-keyed properties on `Object.prototype`, one per point index, to values of their choosing. Named properties cannot be reached this way. The integer keys still affect every object in the page: reading an out-of-range index on any array or plain object returns the attacker's value, and `for...in` over any object yields the injected keys, so unrelated code can take branches it should not using attacker-supplied data, and rendering can fail as a side effect. The properties remain in place once the chart has been built, and no user interaction is required beyond rendering the chart.</p>
<p>Consequences beyond disruption depend on the consuming application.</p>
<p>### Workarounds
Drop-in fix - for any versions affected (6.1.0-13.0.2).
Add the below IIFE to run after Highcharts is loaded.</p>
<p>```javascript
;!function(t){if(t&amp;&amp;t.Point&amp;&amp;!t.Point.prototype.protoPollutionPatched){var o=t.Point.prototype,r=o.optionsToObject,e=o.setNestedProperty,n=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;o.optionsToObject=function(t){if(t&amp;&amp;"object"==typeof t&amp;&amp;!Array.isArray(t)&amp;&amp;(n.call(t,"__proto__")||n.call(t,"constructor"))){var o={};for(var e in t)n.call(t,e)&amp;&amp;!c…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-gfvx-2c2g-38wq"/>
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