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  <updated>2026-10-25T20:41:49.908562+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115877</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-115877</title>
    <updated>2026-10-25T20:41:49.934850+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.web.http.HTTPChannel.headerReceived rejects a NUL byte in an HTTP header value but accepts a bare carriage return or bare line feed. Because Twisted splits header lines only on CRLF, a hidden Content-Length header can remain folded into another value while a lenient front end treats the bare character as a line terminator. The resulting framing disagreement can smuggle a following request past front-end access controls, poison a shared connection or cache, and expose a later client to the wrong response. This issue is an incomplete-fix residual of earlier Twisted request-smuggling protections. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115877"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q7qq-6mhp-9rc4</id>
    <title>GHSA-q7qq-6mhp-9rc4 — Twisted: HTTP Request Smuggling in twisted.web via a Bare CR or LF in a Header Value</title>
    <updated>2026-10-25T20:41:49.934943+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: Twisted</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>An incomplete header-value validation (CWE-444) in the Twisted HTTP server lets a bare carriage return or line feed in a header value hide a following header from the parser. `twisted.web.http.HTTPChannel.headerReceived` rejects a NUL byte in a header value but not a bare CR or LF, even though RFC 9110 section 5.5 requires a recipient to reject all three. Because the channel splits requests only on CRLF, a value carrying a bare LF and a second header arrives as one line, so the second header is folded into the value and the request is framed with no body. A front-end that treats the bare LF as a line terminator frames the request differently, and the disagreement lets an attacker smuggle a request past it. This is an incomplete fix of the earlier Twisted request-smuggling advisories, which guarded the NUL sibling of this exact check.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>`headerReceived` splits a header line on the first colon, strips space and tab from the value, and validates it with a single test that rejects only NUL:</p>
<p>```python
# twisted/web/http.py  HTTPChannel.headerReceived
data = data.strip(b" \t")
if b"\x00" in data:          # NUL rejected; a bare CR or LF is not
    self._respondToBadRequestAndDisconnect()
    return False
```</p>
<p>The channel delimiter is CRLF, so `Foo: x\nContent-Length: 39` is one line: the split yields name `Foo` and value `x\nContent-Length: 39`, `strip` leaves the LF, and the NUL check passes. `_maybeChooseTransferDecoder` is then called with `Foo`, never s…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q7qq-6mhp-9rc4"/>
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