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fkie_cve-2026-111756

2026-10-23T19:30:56.457910+00:00

follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From version 1.16.0 to before version 1.16.1, follow-redirects removes sensitive credential headers (Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie, and any caller-declared sensitiveHeaders) before following a redirect that crosses to a different host or downgrades to a less secure protocol. The removal routine iterates the caller's headers container with for...in and matches header names against a filter. This assumes the headers container is a plain object keyed by header names. Node's underlying http.request, which follow-redirects is a drop-in replacement for, also accepts headers as an alternating array of names and values. For an array, for...in yields the numeric indices "0", "1", "2" and so on, which never match a header-name filter, so nothing is removed. An application that sends array-form headers and follows an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect therefore forwards its Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers verbatim to the attacker-controlled destination, with no error or warning. The sensitiveHeaders option added to fix CVE-2026-40895 / GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 is equally ineffective, because it relies on the same helper. This is an unauthenticated confidentiality vulnerability: any remote server the victim application contacts can harvest the victim's credential headers by responding with a cross-origin redirect. This issue has been patched in version…

GHSA-q3jh-wrc6-jgq8 — follow-redirects array-form headers bypass cross-origin credential stripping

2026-10-23T19:30:56.458015+00:00

Affected: npm: follow-redirects

### Summary follow-redirects removes sensitive credential headers (Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie, and any caller-declared `sensitiveHeaders`) before following a redirect that crosses to a different host or downgrades to a less secure protocol. The removal routine iterates the caller's headers container with `for...in` and matches header names against a filter. This assumes the headers container is a plain object keyed by header names. Node's underlying `http.request`, which follow-redirects is a drop-in replacement for, also accepts headers as an alternating array of names and values. For an array, `for...in` yields the numeric indices `"0"`, `"1"`, `"2"` and so on, which never match a header-name filter, so nothing is removed. An application that sends array-form headers and follows an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect therefore forwards its Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers verbatim to the attacker-controlled destination, with no error or warning. The `sensitiveHeaders` option added to fix CVE-2026-40895 / GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 is equally ineffective, because it relies on the same helper. This is an unauthenticated confidentiality vulnerability: any remote server the victim application contacts can harvest the victim's credential headers by responding with a cross-origin redirect.

### Details The cross-origin credential-stripping control is implemented by `removeMatchingHeaders(regex, headers)` at `index.js:630-640`:

```js function…

RHSA-2026:88478 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update

2026-10-23T19:30:56.458122+00:00

follow-redirects: follow-redirects: Information disclosure via improper regular expression escaping in sensitive header filtering follow-redirects: follow-redirects: Information disclosure via array-formatted headers during cross-origin redirects storybook: Storybook: Arbitrary code execution via insufficient message-origin restrictions storybook: storybook: Arbitrary code execution via exposed WebSocket authentication token