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  <updated>2026-10-08T05:41:23.585007+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-105741</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-105741</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T05:41:23.602721+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. From 1.5.0 until 1.10.3, an IP spoofing vulnerability in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration installation endpoint (POST /api/v1/mcp/project/{project_id}/install) allowed authenticated remote attackers to bypass the "local-only" access restriction. By sending a spoofed X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 header, an attacker could make the server treat the request as originating from localhost, letting them write/overwrite an MCP client configuration file on the server's filesystem. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.10.3.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-105741"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4f6c-2vvp-gw82</id>
    <title>GHSA-4f6c-2vvp-gw82 — Langflow: IP Spoofing Bypass via `X-Forwarded-For` Allowing Remote Configuration Write</title>
    <updated>2026-10-08T05:41:23.602788+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: langflow</p>
<p>**Description**:
### Summary
An IP spoofing vulnerability in the Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration installation endpoint (`POST /api/v1/mcp/project/{project_id}/install`) allowed authenticated remote attackers to bypass the "local-only" access restriction. By sending a spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` header, an attacker could make the server treat the request as originating from localhost, letting them write/overwrite an MCP client configuration file on the server's filesystem.</p>
<p>### Details
The vulnerability lived in the `get_client_ip` helper, used to enforce the local-only gate for `install_mcp_config`. It trusted the leftmost (fully client-controlled) entry of `X-Forwarded-For` unconditionally, with no check for whether the request had actually passed through a trusted proxy.</p>
<p>**Vulnerable code (introduced by commit `d3d06be8e5`, first released in v1.5.0):** `src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/mcp_projects.py`</p>
<p>```python
def get_client_ip(request: Request) -&gt; str:
    # Check for X-Forwarded-For header (common when behind proxies)
    forwarded_for = request.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
    if forwarded_for:
        # The client IP is the first one in the list
        return forwarded_for.split(",")[0].strip()
    if request.client:
        return request.client.host
    return "255.255.255.255"</p>
<p>@router.post("/{project_id}/install")
async def install_mcp_config(
    project_id: UUID,
    body: MCPInstallRequest,        # {client: str, transport: "sse" | "s…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-4f6c-2vvp-gw82"/>
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