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  <updated>2026-11-21T07:57:32.317121+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102945</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-102945</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T07:57:32.318961+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>Aether Project AMF supports termination of NAS signalling, NAS ciphering &amp; integrity protection, registration management, connection management, mobility management, access authentication and authorization, security context management. Prior to 3.1.6, a malformed NGAP PathSwitchRequest can contain a UESecurityCapabilities information element whose extensible APER bit-string representation has no bytes even though decoding reports no error. In ngap/handler.go, HandlePathSwitchRequest checks only whether the element is present before six index-zero reads of its encryption and integrity algorithm fields, causing an unrecovered panic in the NGAP receive goroutine and terminating the AMF. The described attacker is a rogue or compromised gNB on the N2 interface and additionally needs a registered UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID; a bare over-the-air UE cannot trigger the issue. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.6.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102945"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-v6w5-38cf-pcv8</id>
    <title>GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8 — Aether Project amf: panic on an unrecovered NGAP goroutine</title>
    <updated>2026-11-21T07:57:32.319027+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/omec-project/amf</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>HandlePathSwitchRequest guards the UESecurityCapabilities IE for presence but never for length, and the extensible APER type silently yields an empty bit string, so six unguarded index-zero reads panic on an unrecovered goroutine and terminate the AMF. The AMF is the control-plane entry point for a 5G core, so terminating it drops mobility management for every subscriber. Confirmed at HEAD daed5a2 (present in v3.1.5).</p>
<p>## The defect</p>
<p>ngap/handler.go:</p>
<p>```go
if uESecurityCapabilities != nil {                                                                              // line 3267, PRESENCE only
    amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] &amp; 0x80) &gt;&gt; 7)   // line 3268
    ... (five more Bytes[0] reads, lines 3269-3273)
}
```</p>
<p>Six index-zero reads, all guarded only by a nil check on the containing IE. Why the bit string can be empty: the field is declared `aper:"sizeExt,sizeLB:16,sizeUB:16"`. Because the type is EXTENSIBLE, parseBitString DISCARDS the SIZE(16) constraint when the peer sets the extension bit, and then `if rawLength == 0 { return bitString, nil }` returns a bit string with an empty Bytes slice and NO ERROR. So the decoder hands the handler a well-formed, error-free value whose Bytes has length zero, and the handler indexes it. The length guarantee the maintainers rely on comes from an ASN.1 SIZE constraint that the encoder rules legitimately waive on the extension path.</p>
<p>## Verification</p>
<p>P…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-v6w5-38cf-pcv8"/>
  </entry>
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