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  <updated>2026-10-03T10:47:03.838265+00:00</updated>
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    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102758</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-102758</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T10:47:03.848223+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.</p>
<p>The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.</p>
<p>code:</p>
<p>nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c</p>
<p>```</p>
<p>UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,</p>
<p>USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,
                                          const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)</p>
<p>{</p>
<p>UINT   current_index;</p>
<p>USHORT current_tag;</p>
<p>ULONG  length;</p>
<p>ULONG  length_bytes;</p>
<p>current_index = 0;
    current_tag = buffer[current_index];      /* &lt;-- read before the bounds check */
    if (*buffer_length &lt; 1)
    {
        return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
    }</p>
<p>```</p>
<p>The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes &gt; 4 || length_bytes &gt; *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length &gt; *buffer_length`, and the sec…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102758"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qfqh-8mhg-fcvw</id>
    <title>GHSA-qfqh-8mhg-fcvw</title>
    <updated>2026-10-03T10:47:03.848326+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The `_nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse()` function parses ASN.1 TLV (tag-length-value) blocks out of DER-encoded data. It is the primitive underneath all X.509 certificate parsing in NetX Secure, and therefore runs on certificates supplied by a remote peer during the TLS handshake.</p>
<p>The function reads the one-byte ASN.1 tag from the caller's buffer *before* checking that the buffer holds at least one byte. When a caller passes a remaining length of zero, the guard correctly returns `NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG`, but the read has already happened one byte past the end of the buffer.</p>
<p>code:</p>
<p>nx_secure/src/nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse.c</p>
<p>```</p>
<p>UINT _nx_secure_x509_asn1_tlv_block_parse(const UCHAR *buffer, ULONG *buffer_length, USHORT *tlv_type,</p>
<p>USHORT *tlv_tag_class, ULONG *tlv_length,
                                          const UCHAR **tlv_data, ULONG *header_length)</p>
<p>{</p>
<p>UINT   current_index;</p>
<p>USHORT current_tag;</p>
<p>ULONG  length;</p>
<p>ULONG  length_bytes;</p>
<p>current_index = 0;
    current_tag = buffer[current_index];      /* &lt;-- read before the bounds check */
    if (*buffer_length &lt; 1)
    {
        return(NX_SECURE_X509_ASN1_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
    }</p>
<p>```</p>
<p>The remainder of the function is correctly ordered. The multi-byte length path is guarded by `length_bytes &gt; 4 || length_bytes &gt; *buffer_length` before its read loop, the decoded value is checked against `length &gt; *buffer_length`, and the sec…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-qfqh-8mhg-fcvw"/>
  </entry>
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