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  <updated>2026-11-19T08:40:34.144143+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w7jw-789q-3m8p</id>
    <title>GHSA-w7jw-789q-3m8p — shell-quote quote() does not escape newlines in object .op values</title>
    <updated>2026-11-19T08:40:34.150448+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: shell-quote</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`shell-quote`'s `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (`\n`, `\r`, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal `\n` as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command.</p>
<p>The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways. Neither requires the parser to misbehave — `parse()` only emits ops from a fixed control set — but both are documented API surface:</p>
<p>1. **Direct construction.** A caller builds `{ op: '...\n...' }` from external input (e.g. a deserialized argument array) and passes it to `quote()`.
2. **`envFn` return.** `parse(cmd, envFn)` is documented to splice the return value of `envFn` into the result array when it is an object. An attacker-influenced data source consulted by `envFn` can introduce an object token whose `.op` reaches `quote()`.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>Shell command injection in callers that pass object tokens with attacker-influenced `.op` values to `quote()` and then hand the result to a shell. The preconditions are narrower than ordinary string injection — they require the caller to feed object tokens into `quote()` — but object tokens are a public, documented part of the API surface, and `quote()` is intended to be a shell-safety boundary.</p>
<p>### PoC…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-w7jw-789q-3m8p"/>
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