Affected: SwiftURL: github.com/apple/swift-nio-http2, Go: golang.org/x/net, Maven: org.apache.tomcat:tomcat-coyote, Maven: org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core, Maven: org.eclipse.jetty.http2:http2-common, Maven: org.eclipse.jetty.http2:http2-server, Maven: org.eclipse.jetty.http2:jetty-http2-common, Maven: org.eclipse.jetty.http2:jetty-http2-server, Maven: com.typesafe.akka:akka-http-core, Maven: com.typesafe.akka:akka-http-core_2.13 and 2 more

## HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RST_STREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RST_STREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed.

Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RST_STREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open.

The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately.

The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth.

In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the se…