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  <updated>2026-10-01T14:53:19.937691+00:00</updated>
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    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-x44p-gvrj-pj2r</id>
    <title>GHSA-x44p-gvrj-pj2r — Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java has a Key Commitment Issue</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T14:53:19.939874+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Maven: software.amazon.encryption.s3:amazon-s3-encryption-client-java</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>S3 Encryption Client for Java is an open-source client-side encryption library used to facilitate writing and reading encrypted records to S3.</p>
<p>When the encrypted data key (EDK) is stored in an "Instruction File" instead of S3's metadata record, the EDK is exposed to an "Invisible Salamanders" attack  (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/016), which could allow the EDK to be replaced with a new key.</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>### Background - Key Commitment</p>
<p>There is a cryptographic property whereby under certain conditions, a single ciphertext could be decrypted into 2 different plaintexts by using different encryption keys. To address this issue, strong encryption schemes use what is known as "key commitment", a process by which an encrypted message can only be decrypted by one key; the key used to originally encrypt the message.</p>
<p>In older versions of S3EC, when customers are also using a feature called "Instruction File" to store EDKs, key commitment is not implemented because multiple EDKs could be associated to an underlying encrypted message object. For such customers an attack that leverages the lack of key commitment is possible. A bad actor would need two things to leverage this issue: (i) the ability to create a separate, rogue, EDK that will also decrypt the underlying object to produce desired plaintext, and (ii) permission to upload a new instruction file to the S3 bucket to replace the existing instruction file placed there by the user using the S3C.  Any future att…</p></div>
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