Affected: npm: xmldom, npm: @xmldom/xmldom

## Summary

`@xmldom/xmldom` allows attacker-controlled strings containing the CDATA terminator `]]>` to be inserted into a `CDATASection` node. During serialization, `XMLSerializer` emitted the CDATA content verbatim without rejecting or safely splitting the terminator. As a result, data intended to remain text-only became **active XML markup** in the serialized output, enabling XML structure injection and downstream business-logic manipulation.

The sequence `]]>` is not allowed inside CDATA content and must be rejected or safely handled during serialization. ([MDN Web Docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/))

### Attack surface

`Document.createCDATASection(data)` is the most direct entry point, but it is not the only one. The WHATWG DOM spec intentionally does not validate `]]>` in mutation methods — only `createCDATASection` carries that guard. The following paths therefore also allow `]]>` to enter a CDATASection node and reach the serializer:

- `CharacterData.appendData()` - `CharacterData.replaceData()` - `CharacterData.insertData()` - Direct assignment to `.data` - Direct assignment to `.textContent`

(Note: assigning to `.nodeValue` does **not** update `.data` in this implementation — the serializer reads `.data` directly — so `.nodeValue` is not an exploitable path.)

### Parse path

Parsing XML that contains a CDATA section is **not** affected. The SAX parser's non-greedy `CDSect` regex stops at the first `]]>`, so parsed CDATA data never contains the terminator.…