Affected: npm: adm-zip

**Affected package:** adm-zip (npm) **Affected version:** 0.6.0

## Summary

The fix shipped for CVE-2026-39244 (`methods/inflater.js`) caps zlib's decompression output via `maxOutputLength: expectedLength`, where `expectedLength` is read directly from the ZIP entry's attacker-controlled "uncompressed size" header field (`CENLEN`/`LOCLEN`). This cap is only applied when `expectedLength > 0`:

```js const option = version >= 15 && expectedLength > 0 ? { maxOutputLength: expectedLength } : {}; return zlib.inflateRawSync(inbuf, option); ```

If an attacker sets the declared uncompressed-size field to exactly **0**, this condition is false, `option` becomes `{}`, and no output cap is passed to zlib at all. Node then falls back to zlib's own internal default limit (several GB), so a small, highly-compressible payload can still be decompressed to a very large size in memory -- the same class of resource-exhaustion issue the original CVE addressed, just triggered differently.

## Steps to Reproduce

1. Build a ZIP archive containing one DEFLATE-compressed entry whose real content is highly redundant (e.g. several MB of a repeated byte, achieving close to the ~1032:1 theoretical raw-DEFLATE compression ratio). 2. Patch the entry's declared uncompressed-size fields (both the local file header copy and the central directory copy, 4-byte little-endian values) to `0`. The compressed bytes and CRC32 are left untouched -- CRC validation still passes because CRC is computed over the real d…