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  <updated>2026-10-01T15:54:13.261373+00:00</updated>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vmf3-w455-68vh</id>
    <title>GHSA-vmf3-w455-68vh — node-tar applies PAX size override to intermediary GNU long-name/long-link headers, causing tar parser interpretation d…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T15:54:13.276080+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: tar</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`tar` (node-tar) applies a PAX extended header's `size=` record (and other PAX
overrides) to the **next header entry of any type**, including intermediary
metadata headers such as a GNU long-name (`L`) or long-link (`K`) entry. Per
POSIX pax, a PAX extended header (`x`) describes the *next file entry*, not the
intermediary extension headers that may sit between the `x` header and the file
it annotates. Because node-tar lets the PAX `size` override the byte length of
an intervening `L`/`K`/`x` header, an attacker can desynchronize node-tar's
stream cursor relative to every other mainstream tar implementation
(GNU tar, libarchive/bsdtar, Python `tarfile`, and the now-fixed `tar-rs` /
`astral-tokio-tar`).</p>
<p>The result is a tar parser **interpretation differential** (CWE-436): a single
crafted archive yields a different set of members under node-tar than under the
reference tar tools. An attacker can use this to hide a member from one parser
while it is visible to another, which defeats security tooling whose scanner and
extractor disagree on archive contents (e.g. a malware/secret scanner that lists
entries with one library while a downstream step extracts with another). node-tar
is one of the most widely deployed JavaScript tar libraries (it backs `npm`'s own
package-tarball handling and is a transitive dependency of a very large fraction
of the npm ecosystem), so the blast radius for "files that extract differently
depending on the tool" is broad.</p>
<p>This is the sam…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vmf3-w455-68vh"/>
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