Affected: npm: basic-ftp

## Summary

basic-ftp's CRLF injection protection (added in commit 2ecc8e2 for GHSA-chqc-8p9q-pq6q) is incomplete. Two code paths bypass the `protectWhitespace()` control character check: (1) the `login()` method directly concatenates user-supplied credentials into USER/PASS FTP commands without any validation, and (2) the `_openDir()` method sends an MKD command before `cd()` invokes `protectWhitespace()`, creating a TOCTOU bypass. Both vectors allow an attacker who controls input to inject arbitrary FTP commands into the control connection.

## Details

### Vector 1: Credential Injection (login)

The `login()` method constructs FTP commands by direct string concatenation with no CRLF validation:

```typescript // src/Client.ts:216-231 login(user = "anonymous", password = "guest"): Promise<FTPResponse> { this.ftp.log(`Login security: ${describeTLS(this.ftp.socket)}`) return this.ftp.handle("USER " + user, (res, task) => { // Line 218: no validation on `user` // ... else if (res.code === 331) { this.ftp.send("PASS " + password) // Line 226: no validation on `password` } }) } ```

`FtpContext.send()` writes directly to the TCP socket:

```typescript // src/FtpContext.ts:223-227 send(command: string) { // ... this._socket.write(command + "\r\n", this.encoding) } ```

The `protectWhitespace()` method (line 762) rejects `\r`, `\n`, and `\0` characters — but it is only called for path-based operations. Credentials never pa…