Affected: npm: tar

### Summary `tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a symlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative symlink target such as `C:../../../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction.

### Details The extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` validates `..` segments against a resolved path that still uses the original drive-relative value, and only afterwards rewrites the stored `linkpath` to the stripped value.

What happens with `linkpath: "C:../../../target.txt"`: 1. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../../../target.txt`. 2. The escape check resolves using the original pre-stripped value, so it is treated as in-bounds and accepted. 3. Symlink creation uses the rewritten value (`../../../target.txt`) from nested path `a/b/l`. 4. Writing through the extracted symlink overwrites the outside file (`../target.txt`).

This is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

### PoC Tested on Arch Linux with `tar@7.5.10`.

PoC script (`poc.cjs`):

```js const fs = require('fs') const path = require('path') const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd() const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt') const tarFile = path.join(cwd, 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536) new Header({ path: 'a/b/l', type: 'SymbolicLink', linkpath: 'C:../../../target.t…