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  <updated>2026-10-01T23:31:43.221953+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-101918</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-101918 — PyJWT: Unauthenticated RecursionError DoS in pre-verification payload parse (PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt / ver…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T23:31:43.224231+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> jpadilla pyjwt</p>
<p>PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.0.0a1 until 2.15.0, PyJWT PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt is affected because payload parser catches ValueError but not RecursionError. This occurs when an attacker-controlled recursively nested payload reaches json.loads. As a result, documented PyJWT exception handling does not contain the failure. Consequently, an unauthenticated request can raise an exception that may produce an HTTP 500 response. The advisory-defined affected implementation also includes jwt/api_jwt.py, verify_signature=False. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-101918"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-42vr-xj54-vc7v</id>
    <title>GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v — PyJWT: Unauthenticated RecursionError DoS in pre-verification payload parse (PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt / ver…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-01T23:31:43.224324+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: PyJWT</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>`PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token)` — the first step of the JWKS
verification flow documented in `docs/usage.rst` — must decode a token's
payload before its signature can be checked, via
`jwt.api_jwt.decode_complete(token, options={"verify_signature": False})`.
That call parses the payload with `json.loads` in `PyJWT._decode_payload`
(`jwt/api_jwt.py:297-300`), whose `except` clause catches only `ValueError`.
A payload that is valid JSON but nested ~20,000 levels deep makes
`json.loads` raise `RecursionError`, which is **not** a `ValueError` and
escapes as a raw, undocumented exception type — not `DecodeError`,
`InvalidTokenError`, or `PyJWTError`, so every documented error-handling
pattern in `docs/usage.rst` misses it.</p>
<p>The token needs no valid signature and no network access — the crash
happens during payload parsing, before the `kid` is even looked up. A
single unauthenticated ~50KB request crashes the caller's auth handler
(HTTP 500 / dead worker), repeatably. The same path is reachable through
plain `jwt.decode(token, options={"verify_signature": False})` too.</p>
<p>Notably, this project already fixed the **identical** bug class for the
JWS **header** path — `PyJWS._load` catches `(ValueError, RecursionError)`
and wraps it in `DecodeError` (`jwt/api_jws.py:360-361`), and
`CHANGELOG.rst` (v2.14.0, "Security") states "Handle deeply nested and
malformed JWS/JWK input without uncaught recursion errors." The payload
path — the one part of a forged token an…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-42vr-xj54-vc7v"/>
  </entry>
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