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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-31T23:20:27.033196+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-113718</id>
    <title>BIT-virtualenv-2026-113718 — virtualenv: Xonsh activation literals depend on the script decoding codec</title>
    <updated>2026-10-31T23:20:27.035405+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Bitnami: virtualenv</p>
<p>virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, POSIX xonsh activation quote() uses repr() to write printable non-ASCII prompt or destination data into UTF-8 activate.xsh, while xonsh can read that script using $XONSH_ENCODING. Under a legacy multibyte codec such as GBK or Big5, a UTF-8 trail byte can consume the backslash before an adjacent quote, allowing the literal to close and attacker-influenced statements to execute when the user sources the generated script. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-113718"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-113718</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-113718 — virtualenv: Xonsh activation literals depend on the script decoding codec</title>
    <updated>2026-10-31T23:20:27.035477+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> pypa virtualenv</p>
<p>virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. Prior to 21.14.9, POSIX xonsh activation quote() uses repr() to write printable non-ASCII prompt or destination data into UTF-8 activate.xsh, while xonsh can read that script using $XONSH_ENCODING. Under a legacy multibyte codec such as GBK or Big5, a UTF-8 trail byte can consume the backslash before an adjacent quote, allowing the literal to close and attacker-influenced statements to execute when the user sources the generated script. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.9.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-113718"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-394h-qwmc-48pf</id>
    <title>GHSA-394h-qwmc-48pf — virtualenv: Xonsh activation literals depend on the script decoding codec</title>
    <updated>2026-10-31T23:20:27.035513+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: virtualenv</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>Caller-supplied prompt text can become executable syntax in the xonsh activation script. An attacker must influence the
value passed to virtualenv, and a user must subsequently activate the environment.</p>
<p>## Affected area</p>
<p>Xonsh reads a UTF-8 activation script using a legacy multibyte encoding such as GBK. Printable non-ASCII bytes can
change how the reader recognizes an adjacent quote. The report concerns POSIX activation. It does not establish exposure
through unrelated activators.</p>
<p>## Attacker-controlled input</p>
<p>The attacker controls prompt or destination data passed as a virtualenv argument. The user later sources the generated
activation script.</p>
<p>## Affected code</p>
<p>The relevant 21.14.8 source is in
[xonsh quote()](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/activation/xonsh/__init__.py),
[UTF-8 template writer](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/activation/via_template.py).</p>
<p>## Mechanism</p>
<p>The generator writes `activate.xsh` as UTF-8. Its `quote()` used `repr()`, which leaves printable non-ASCII characters
in the file and backslash-escapes an embedded quote. Xonsh's `source` reads the file using `$XONSH_ENCODING`. With GBK
or Big5, the UTF-8 bytes of `中` end in `0xad`, which pairs with the following `0x5c` backslash as one decoded character.
The backslash no longer escapes the quote. A prompt containing both quote kinds can then close its Python strin…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-394h-qwmc-48pf"/>
  </entry>
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