Affected: BerriAI litellm, Red Hat Exploit Intelligence, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.80.5 to before version 1.83.7, the POST /prompts/test endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process. The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow commands to be run on the host. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.

Affected: PyPI: litellm

### Impact The `POST /prompts/test` endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process.

The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow commands to be run on the host.

Proxy deployments running an affected version are in scope.

### Patches The issue is fixed in **`1.83.7-stable`**. The fix switches the prompt template renderer to a sandboxed environment that blocks the attributes this attack relies on.

LiteLLM recommends upgrading to `1.83.7-stable` or later.

### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible:

1. Block `POST /prompts/test` at your reverse proxy or API gateway. 2. Review and rotate API keys that should not have access to prompt management routes.

Affected: PyPI: litellm

### Impact The `POST /prompts/test` endpoint accepted user-supplied prompt templates and rendered them without sandboxing. A crafted template could run arbitrary code inside the LiteLLM Proxy process.

The endpoint only checks that the caller presents a valid proxy API key, so any authenticated user could reach it. Depending on how the proxy is deployed, this could expose secrets in the process environment (such as provider API keys or database credentials) and allow commands to be run on the host.

Proxy deployments running an affected version are in scope.

### Patches The issue is fixed in **`1.83.7-stable`**. The fix switches the prompt template renderer to a sandboxed environment that blocks the attributes this attack relies on.

LiteLLM recommends upgrading to `1.83.7-stable` or later.

### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible:

1. Block `POST /prompts/test` at your reverse proxy or API gateway. 2. Review and rotate API keys that should not have access to prompt management routes.