https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-03T20:54:03.269681+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@gcve.eu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-50021 CVE-2026-50021 — pnpm: Integrity Check Bypass via Missing Lockfile Integrity Field 2026-10-03T20:54:03.273500+00:00

Affected: pnpm

pnpm is a package manager. Prior to 10.34.0 and 11.4.0, pnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the integrity field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify pnpm-lock.yaml to remove the integrity: field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, pnpm install --frozen-lockfile can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's npm ci enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.34.0 and 11.4.0.

 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3 GHSA-q6j5-fjx5-2mc3 — pnpm Has an Integrity Check Bypass via Missing Lockfile Integrity Field 2026-10-03T20:54:03.273627+00:00

Affected: npm: pnpm

## Summary

pnpm's tarball extraction worker skips integrity verification when the `integrity` field is absent from the lockfile resolution. If an attacker can both modify `pnpm-lock.yaml` to remove the `integrity:` field and cause the referenced registry URL to serve altered package content, `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` can install the altered package without an integrity error. npm's `npm ci` enforces integrity by default; pnpm's behavior of silently skipping verification is a pnpm-specific fail-open gap.

## Vulnerability Details

The `addTarballToStore` function in `worker/src/start.ts` (lines 189-204) checks `if (integrity)` before verifying the tarball hash. The `TarballResolution` type declares `integrity` as optional (`integrity?: string`). When the lockfile omits the `integrity` field, the guard evaluates to `false`, skipping hash verification entirely. The worker then computes a new hash from the unverified content and stores it as legitimate.

```typescript // worker/src/start.ts:189-204 function addTarballToStore ({ buffer, storeDir, integrity, ... }: TarballExtractMessage) { if (integrity) { // false when integrity is undefined const { algorithm, hexDigest } = parseIntegrity(integrity) const calculatedHash = crypto.hash(algorithm, buffer, 'hex') if (calculatedHash !== hexDigest) { return { status: 'error', error: { type: 'integrity_validation_failed', ... } } } } return { status: 'success', value: { integrity: in…