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  <id>https://db.gcve.eu/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-09-28T08:20:10.445708+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53537</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-53537 — Python-Multipart: Content-Disposition parameter smuggling via RFC 2231/5987 extended parameters</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T08:20:10.447748+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Kludex python-multipart</p>
<p>Python-Multipart is a streaming multipart parser for Python. Prior to 0.0.30, parse_options_header parsed Content-Disposition (and Content-Type) headers with email.message.Message, which transparently applies RFC 2231/5987 decoding. The extended parameter syntax (filename*=charset'lang'value, name*=..., and the filename*0/filename*1 continuation form) is decoded and surfaced under the bare filename/name key, and overrides the plain parameter when both are present. RFC 7578 §4.2 explicitly forbids the filename* form in multipart/form-data. Components that follow RFC 7578, or that do not implement RFC 2231/5987 decoding for multipart/form-data (WAFs, proxies, gateways), may interpret such a header differently. An attacker can exploit that difference to smuggle a different field name or filename past an upstream inspector to the backend. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.0.30.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53537"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vffw-93wf-4j4q</id>
    <title>GHSA-vffw-93wf-4j4q — python-multipart: Content-Disposition parameter smuggling via RFC 2231/5987 extended parameters</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T08:20:10.447831+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: python-multipart</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`parse_options_header` parsed `Content-Disposition` (and `Content-Type`) headers with [`email.message.Message`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/email.compat32-message.html#email.message.Message), which transparently applies [RFC 2231](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2231)/[5987](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5987) decoding. The extended parameter syntax (`filename*=charset'lang'value`, `name*=...`, and the `filename*0`/`filename*1` continuation form) is decoded and surfaced under the bare `filename`/`name` key, and overrides the plain parameter when both are present. [RFC 7578 §4.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7578#section-4.2) explicitly forbids the `filename*` form in `multipart/form-data`.</p>
<p>Components that follow RFC 7578, or that do not implement RFC 2231/5987 decoding for `multipart/form-data` (WAFs, proxies, gateways), may interpret such a header differently. An attacker can exploit that difference to smuggle a different field name or filename past an upstream inspector to the backend.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Given both a plain and an extended parameter, the extended value won. For example:</p>
<p>```
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="comment"; name*=utf-8''role
```</p>
<p>An inspector following RFC 7578 sees the field `comment`, while the returned value was `name=role`. The same applies to filenames:</p>
<p>```
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="safe.txt"; filename*=utf-8''evil.php
```</p>
<p>The inspector sees `safe.txt`, while…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-vffw-93wf-4j4q"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3041</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3041 — python-multipart: Content-Disposition parameter smuggling via RFC 2231/5987 extended parameters</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T08:20:10.447893+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: python-multipart</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>`parse_options_header` parsed `Content-Disposition` (and `Content-Type`) headers with [`email.message.Message`](https://docs.python.org/3/library/email.compat32-message.html#email.message.Message), which transparently applies [RFC 2231](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2231)/[5987](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5987) decoding. The extended parameter syntax (`filename*=charset'lang'value`, `name*=...`, and the `filename*0`/`filename*1` continuation form) is decoded and surfaced under the bare `filename`/`name` key, and overrides the plain parameter when both are present. [RFC 7578 §4.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7578#section-4.2) explicitly forbids the `filename*` form in `multipart/form-data`.</p>
<p>Components that follow RFC 7578, or that do not implement RFC 2231/5987 decoding for `multipart/form-data` (WAFs, proxies, gateways), may interpret such a header differently. An attacker can exploit that difference to smuggle a different field name or filename past an upstream inspector to the backend.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>Given both a plain and an extended parameter, the extended value won. For example:</p>
<p>```
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="comment"; name*=utf-8''role
```</p>
<p>An inspector following RFC 7578 sees the field `comment`, while the returned value was `name=role`. The same applies to filenames:</p>
<p>```
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="safe.txt"; filename*=utf-8''evil.php
```</p>
<p>The inspector sees `safe.txt`, while…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/pysec-2026-3041"/>
  </entry>
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