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  <updated>2026-09-28T17:50:16.479702+00:00</updated>
  <author>
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    <email>info@gcve.eu</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53823</id>
    <title>CVE-2026-53823 — OpenClaw &lt; 2026.5.3 - Privilege Escalation via Mutable Slack Display Names in allowFrom</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T17:50:16.481364+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> OpenClaw</p>
<p>OpenClaw before 2026.5.3 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in the allowFrom feature that binds to mutable Slack display names. Attackers with Slack account access can change display name metadata to match policy entries, potentially gaining unauthorized agent access intended for other identities.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-53823"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-c29c-2q9c-pc86</id>
    <title>GHSA-c29c-2q9c-pc86 — OpenClaw: Slack allowFrom could bind to mutable display names</title>
    <updated>2026-09-28T17:50:16.481443+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Slack allowFrom could bind to mutable display names. In affected versions, a Slack account able to change display name metadata could match a policy entry through mutable display metadata.</p>
<p>This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could receive agent access intended for another Slack identity. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.</p>
<p>### Patched Versions</p>
<p>The first stable patched version is `2026.5.3`.</p>
<p>### Mitigations</p>
<p>use stable Slack user IDs in allowlists until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.</p></div>
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    <link href="https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-c29c-2q9c-pc86"/>
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