Affected: OpenClaw

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.2 contain a vulnerability in the gateway WebSocket connect handshake in which it allows skipping device identity checks when auth.token is present but not validated. Attackers can connect to the gateway without providing device identity or pairing by exploiting the presence check instead of validation, potentially gaining operator access in vulnerable deployments.

Affected: npm: openclaw

### Summary

The gateway WebSocket `connect` handshake could allow skipping device identity checks when `auth.token` was present but not yet validated.

### Details

In `src/gateway/server/ws-connection/message-handler.ts`, the device-identity requirement could be bypassed based on the *presence* of a non-empty `connectParams.auth.token` rather than a *validated* shared-secret authentication result.

### Impact

In deployments where the gateway WebSocket is reachable and connections can be authorized via Tailscale without validating the shared secret, a client could connect without providing device identity/pairing. Depending on version and configuration, this could result in operator access.

### Deployment Guidance

Per OpenClaw security guidance, the gateway should only be reachable from a trusted network and by trusted users (for example, restrict Tailnet users/ACLs when using Tailscale Serve).

If the gateway WebSocket is only reachable by trusted users, there is typically no untrusted party with network access to exploit this issue.

### Affected Packages / Versions

- Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected: `<= 2026.2.1` - Fixed: `>= 2026.2.2`

### Fix

Device-identity skipping now requires *validated* shared-secret authentication (token/password). Tailscale-authenticated connections without validated shared secret require device identity.

### Fix Commit(s)

- fe81b1d7125a014b8280da461f34efbf5f761575

Thanks @simecek for reporting.